After FIA summonses and hearings following the F1 Azerbaijan Grand Prix on 26 September, Isack Hadjar, Carlos Sainz and Gabriel Bortoleto each received a ruling. Hadjar and Sainz were warned for failing to follow pit-exit requirements during reconnaissance laps; Bortoleto received a ten-second penalty for overtaking under yellow flags. The three investigations opened by summonses numbered 60 to 62 were resolved in documents 68 to 70.
Reconnaissance-lap exit: different routes for practice starts and proceeding directly to the track
Item 13.6 of the event’s race director’s notes states that, on reconnaissance laps to the grid, practice starts may be performed in the marked grid box on the left side of the exit lane. Cars must not cross the white line separating that lane from the track. Cars not intending to practise a start must cross the white line as soon as possible, join the normal racing line and then not return across it into the exit lane.
Decision number 69 found that Hadjar ultimately did not practise a start but stayed in the exit lane, passed to the right of a car ahead and only then joined the circuit. He had intended to practise a start, cancelled the attempt late and set off again, a sequence that distracted him. The stewards found a failure to follow the race director’s instructions but accepted those mitigating circumstances, issuing a warning rather than a driving reprimand.
In decision number 70, Sainz did not intend to practise a start but likewise stayed in the exit lane and passed to the right of a car waiting to do so. The hearing confirmed that Williams had given him incorrect driving instructions and that he followed them. The stewards still found a breach, but treated the wrong instructions as significant mitigation and also issued a warning.
Bortoleto: no safety-car deployment, but an independently valid yellow flag
Decision number 68 records the incident between Turns 6 and 7 on the first lap after the race restart. A physical “SC” board and waved yellow flags were displayed together, but race control had not actually deployed the safety car. Bortoleto saw no corresponding electronic indication, and the team told him there was no safety car. He subsequently overtook Sergio Pérez.
The stewards accepted that the conflicting signals caused confusion and ruled out overtaking under safety-car conditions. However, Bortoleto admitted seeing the yellow flag. A waved yellow flag must still be obeyed in its own right, so he was penalised ten seconds for overtaking under yellows. The FIA’s final race classification lists Hadjar third, Sainz tenth and Bortoleto fifteenth after the penalty.
INKA SPORTS analysis: why mitigation did not remove the duty to comply
Item 13.6 assigns different routes to cars preparing a practice start and cars proceeding directly to the grid. Remaining in the lane without practising a start and passing cars waiting to do so undermines that separation. Hadjar’s late change of plan therefore meant more than omitting one practice start: the driving procedure applicable afterwards also changed. Both rulings concerned failure to follow the appropriate route; a collision was not required for a breach to exist.
The warnings reflect the stewards’ differentiation of individual responsibility. Hadjar’s mitigation was distraction caused by a late change in his operating plan; Sainz’s was compliance with incorrect team instructions. Neither was treated as complete exemption. Drivers remained responsible for obeying the race director’s requirements; the circumstances reduced the severity of the sanction. Team communication can explain how an action occurred, but must still be assessed against the established driving requirements.
The role of communication differs particularly between Bortoleto’s and Sainz’s cases. The team telling Bortoleto that the safety car had not been deployed was correct in itself. His mistake was using that clarification also to dismiss the yellow flag he had seen. Safety-car status and a yellow flag’s validity are independent judgements: the former ruled out one suspected offence, while the latter still supported a time penalty. That is why the three cases cannot be placed on the same penalty scale merely because all involved unclear information.
Conclusion
The boundaries are clear: the reconnaissance-lap route depends on the action actually being performed, while yellow flags impose an independent obligation. Changed plans, wrong team instructions and conflicting trackside signals affect the stewards’ assessment of causes and responsibility but do not automatically remove the duty to comply. The two warnings reflect mitigation after a breach was established; the ten-second penalty preserves the prohibition on overtaking under yellows. Those distinctions explain the different outcomes.
